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Quotations from these 
“migrants’ stories,”  
collected in the months  
preceding the 2008 attacks, 
cast serious doubt on any 
notion that those attacks 
were isolated, aberrant, or 
the work of a few “rogue 
elements.”
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Locating Xenophobia:  
Debate, Discourse, and Everyday  
Experience in Cape Town, South Africa
Belinda Dodson
In May 2008, South Africa experienced an outbreak of vio-
lence against foreign Africans living in the country. Political 
leaders expressed shock and surprise, but there has in reality 
been long-standing and well-documented hostility toward 
African immigrants in South Africa. Several competing expla-
nations have been put forward, with debate gaining urgency 
and polarization since the xenophobic attacks of 2008. After 
a selective review of the relevant literature to sketch the 
contours of that debate, this paper presents findings from 
research conducted with African immigrants living in Cape 
Town. Their experiences provide further evidence that anti-
immigrant attitudes and behaviors on the part of “ordinary 
South Africans” toward foreign Africans are entrenched and 
systemic. The paper concludes by calling for further academic 
engagement and greater political commitment.
In May 2008, graphic images of violent attacks on foreign Africans living in 
South Africa—scenes of knife- and stick-wielding aggressors, wounded vic-
tims, burning houses, and even, in the most horrific photographs, a burning 
man—were seen around the world.1 These were soon replaced by images of 
people who had fled in fear of their lives to seek refuge in churches and police 
stations, eventually to be rehoused in tent settlements like those housing 
famine or war refugees. The attacks left more than sixty people dead and 
more than one hundred thousand homeless (Crush et al. 2008; Steinberg 
2008a). They profoundly shocked both the international community and 
many South Africans themselves. Shamed by association with their fellow 
citizens’ display of barbarism, South Africans of all races took to the streets 
in protest marches reminiscent of the antiapartheid struggle. They carried 
placards with slogans such as Shame On Us, Join the Fight Against Xeno-
phobia, Don’t Touch My Sista, and No Black in the Rainbow? (referring 
to Archbishop Desmond Tutu and others’ designation of South Africa as a 
multiracial rainbow nation).2
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In the time since, some scholarly attention has been devoted to the 
outbreak of violence (e.g. Crush et al. 2008; Neocosmos 2008; Pillay 2008a, 
2008b; Sharp 2008a, 2008b), as well as considerable effort by think tanks, 
civil society organizations, and the state-funded Human Sciences Research 
Council to understand and explain the antiforeigner attacks and make 
recommendations as to how any recurrence might be prevented (e.g. Con-
sortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa 2008; Hadland 2008; 
Human Sciences Research Council 2008; Igglesden, Molson, and Polzer 2009; 
Misago, Landau, and Monson 2009; Steinberg 2008b). Strong differences of 
opinion have emerged about the root causes of xenophobia in South Africa 
and whether the attacks warrant the label “xenophobic” at all. While such 
focus on the events of 2008 is understandable and justified, much can be 
learned from an examination of the circumstances predating these overt 
attacks. Earlier, more quotidian expressions and experiences of xenophobia 
demonstrate how deeply entrenched anti-immigrant feeling is in South 
Africa and how it is manifest in the everyday lives of Africans from countries 
to the north.
This paper argues that the attacks of May 2008 were indeed xenophobic; 
that their causes lie in a complex of economic, political, social, and cultural 
factors, both contemporary and historical; and that less violent, “ordinary” 
experiences of xenophobia are part of the everyday lives of African immigrants 
in South Africa. The eruption of 2008, while a highly significant and deeply 
sobering moment for anyone concerned with protecting a nonracial, progres-
sive, rights-based society, should not have struck anyone as a surprise. As 
already noted by Crush et al. (2008), this was a “perfect storm” of elements 
already in place, dating back well before 2008. For while the apartheid state’s 
hostility toward black Africa and Africans was explicit and expected, the end 
of apartheid did not bring a clean break with the past. The supposed “rainbow 
nation” has in reality been a strongly exclusionary space. Postapartheid immi-
gration policy, cast initially in terms of “alien control,” has yet to grapple 
effectively with immigration and its management (Crush 1999 and 2002; 
Crush and Dodson 2007; Crush and McDonald 2001). Senior government 
ministers and officials have blamed “illegal immigrants” for placing strain 
on state resources or engaging in criminal activity. There have been incidents 
of police brutality and indiscriminate arrests of suspected foreigners, while 
the Lindela Deportation Centre has seen numerous rights abuses against for-
eign nationals. “Ordinary” South Africans, long before 2008, targeted foreign 
Africans for everything from mockery to murder (Crush et al. 2008; Harris 
2001; Lefko-Everett 2008; Murray 2003). Statistically representative surveys 
have been conducted inquiring into South Africans’ opinions of foreigners, in 
particular foreign Africans, showing that South Africans across race, class, and 
gender lines hold deep-seated antiforeigner sentiments and attitudes (Afroba-
rometer 2009; Crush et al. 2008; Mattes et al. 1999). Little wonder, then, that 
the lives of foreign Africans living in South Africa—whether recent arrivals 
or long established; legally or illegally resident; economic migrants, asylum 
seekers, or refugees—are marked by discrimination, exclusion, and fear.
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The paper consists of two main parts. The first presents a selective 
overview of the literature on xenophobia in South Africa, especially that 
written since the 2008 violence, highlighting the competing explanations 
that are emerging along with the intellectual and theoretical frameworks 
within which the main arguments are being developed. The second part of 
the paper presents the findings of primary, qualitative research conducted in 
Cape Town, South Africa, between October 2007 and April 2008. Migrants 
recorded their personal stories in solicited journals, outlining their migra-
tion histories and describing their experiences as foreign Africans in Cape 
Town. Quotations from these stories, collected in the months preceding 
the 2008 attacks, cast serious doubt on any notion that those attacks were 
isolated, aberrant, or the work of a few rogue elements. Rather, they provide 
further supporting evidence that xenophobia is entrenched and systemic in 
South African society, requiring similarly systemic responses if it is to be 
meaningfully addressed.
The Hate That Dare Not Speak Its Name?  
Competing Explanations and Intellectual Framings
Debate about the nature, causes, and appropriate responses to the 2008 
antiforeigner attacks was quick to emerge but soon died down, or at least 
moved from more immediate media and political responses to the realm 
of academic conferences and journals. Demonstrating that xenophobia is 
a long-standing problem in the country, a significant preexisting literature 
details and attempts to explain discrimination against foreigners (Crush 
1999 and 2002; Danso and McDonald 2001; Dodson and Oelofse 2000; Harris 
2001, 2002; Landau, Ramjathan-Keogh, and Singh 2005; Morris 1998; Murray 
2003; Neocosmos 2006; Nyamnjoh 2006; Reitzes 2002; Vigneswaran 2007). 
Much of the analysis published since the 2008 violence repeats and rein-
forces themes that had emerged in earlier work. At least six primary axes of 
explanation can be identified. These partially intersect and partially diverge.
First and foremost are economic or material explanations. In this line 
of argument, poor (still largely black) South African nationals see foreign 
Africans as competing with them for jobs, housing, and other services and 
resources to which they themselves feel entitled, while wealthier South Afri-
cans, black and white, resent “paying taxes to provide shelter and services to 
people seen to be pouring into South Africa to escape political incompetence 
and economic mismanagement further north” (Sharp 2008a:2). At the com-
munity level, this produces what has been aptly described as an “ethnicised 
political economy,” in which “microeconomic friction is displaced into 
hate-filled nationalism” (Manzi and Bond 2008). An interesting gender and 
sexual dimension to interpersonal competition between South Africans and 
foreigners has also been identified, with foreign men blamed for “flashing 
money around” and “stealing women from local men” (Dodson and Oelofse 
2000:141).3 That migration to South Africa remains heavily male-dominated 
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(Dodson 1998, 2008) likely contributes to both a perception and the reality 
of foreign men forming intimate relationships with South African women. 
There is also some validity in the idea of immigrants “stealing jobs”—not 
because employment is a zero-sum game, but because immigrants, especially 
those not legally permitted to work in South Africa, can be employed at 
lower wages and without the statutory benefits and protections attached to 
the employment of citizens, and thus compete unfairly with South Africans 
in certain low-wage sectors of the economy. A high rate of unemployment 
(officially 24.5 percent in the third quarter of 2009), especially among black 
South Africans, exacerbates the intensity of competition for jobs in both the 
formal and informal sectors of the economy.
A second axis of explanation is more social, or perhaps sociopoliti-
cal, proposing that construction of a new, nonracial sense of South African 
national identity after the end of apartheid inevitably meant the creation 
of a new oppositional “other,” and that this “other” is essentially defined 
as “non-South African” (Murray 2003; Peberdy 2001, Reitzes 2002). The 
clearest, most present manifestation of this “other” is those foreign Afri-
cans actually living in South Africa, described by Murray (2003:460) as “the 
ultimate strangers—the new helots—within the social landscape of South 
African cities.”
Closely and causally linked to this is the third type of explanation: cul-
tural stereotyping. Increased immigration to South Africa from other African 
countries has brought South Africans into direct contact with foreign Afri-
cans to a far greater extent than during the apartheid era, when black immi-
gration to South Africa was almost entirely prohibited, but for exceptions 
such as the temporary migration of mine labor (Crush and Dodson 2007; 
Peberdy 2001). Furthermore, postapartheid African immigrants have come 
from a far wider, more pan-African set of source countries than perhaps at 
any time in South Africa’s history (Morris and Bouillon 2001; Western 2001). 
Mutual stereotyping of foreigners by South Africans and of South Africans 
by foreigners essentializes and exaggerates perceived cultural differences 
and thus gives rise to prejudice and antagonism (Harris 2002; Morris 1998).
The fourth and fifth axes of explanation for xenophobia in South Africa 
lie in the realm of the political. In small-p political terms, antiforeigner 
attitudes are seen as being rooted in black South Africans’ acquisition of the 
full rights and benefits of citizenship, and their subsequent jealous protec-
tion of those rights and benefits against perceived threats of undermining or 
usurpation by noncitizens (Murray 2003; Nyamnjoh 2006). Certainly, there 
is evidence of popular confusion over which rights are universal, which apply 
to all who live in South Africa, and which are restricted to citizens alone, 
together with confusion about who is legally entitled to live and work in 
South Africa (Mattes et al. 1999; Crush et al. 2008). Such confusion is itself 
a potential source of conflict between South African citizens and those per-
ceived as foreigners or “aliens”—who, further, are often conflated with being 
“illegal” and stereotyped as being dangerous and undesirable, including by 
the South African media (Danso and McDonald 2001; Fine and Bird 2006; 
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Jacobs and McDonald 2005; Vigneswaran 2007). In big-P political terms, lack 
of political leadership has been put forward as a factor in the production and 
reproduction of xenophobic attitudes (Crush et al. 2008; Steinberg 2008a, 
2008b). Among senior government figures, right up to the three postapart-
heid presidents, attitudes toward foreign Africans in South Africa have been 
at best ambivalent and occasionally downright negative. Nelson Mandela 
himself, in a speech on the National Day of Safety and Security in 1994 just 
a few months after he had become president, stated, “the fact that illegal 
immigrants are involved in violent criminal activity must not tempt us into 
the dangerous attitude which regards all foreigners with hostility.” Such 
language became almost a leitmotif, serving to promote the association of 
immigrants with not just illegality but actual criminality, despite evidence 
that African immigrants are far likelier to be victims than perpetrators of 
criminal activity (Danso and McDonald 2001; Harris 2001). Rather than a 
lack of political leadership, this might better be seen as all too strong and 
influential political leadership, but in quite the opposite direction to that 
which one might expect of a rights-respecting, democratic state.
A sixth axis of explanation for xenophobia is denial of its very exis-
tence, best captured in the words of President Thabo Mbeki. On 3 July 2008, 
as reported in numerous media outlets, including the Pretoria News, he told 
a gathering in tribute to victims of the attacks that this was not xenophobia, 
but “naked criminal activity.” He went on:
What happened during those days was not inspired by pos-
sessed nationalism, or extreme chauvinism, resulting in our 
communities violently expressing the hitherto unknown sen-
timents of mass and mindless hatred of foreigners—xenopho-
bia. . . . I heard it said insistently that my people have turned 
or become xenophobic. . . . I wondered what the accusers knew 
about my people which I did not know. And this I must also 
say—none in our society has any right to encourage or incite 
xenophobia by trying to explain naked criminal activity by 
cloaking it in the garb of xenophobia.
It is hard to disentangle all the threads in this nonexplanation for the causes 
of the attacks, criminal though they were, but Mbeki’s statement represents 
either a sophisticated form of denialism4 or a staggering expression of igno-
rance. Whatever other material, political, cultural, or social forces might 
have been at work, the clear and explicit targeting of foreign nationals for 
brutal physical attack must surely be seen and understood as xenophobic, 
or at very least anti-immigrant. Contrary to Mbeki’s assertions, “possessed 
nationalism” seems a perfectly apt description of the expressions of hatred 
toward foreigners heard from the perpetrators of the May 2008 attacks. 
William Gumede had already noted how Mbeki’s vision of South Africa 
as speaking on behalf of Africa and the developing world had “not filtered 
down to the rank and file,” with “incidents of xenophobia against émigrés 
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from the rest of Africa becom[ing] increasingly commonplace on the streets 
of South African cities” (2007:155). For Mbeki, xenophobia on the part of 
South Africans could not readily be accommodated within the discourse of 
an African Renaissance and was therefore denied. More directly, Mbeki’s 
weak stance on Zimbabwe and the resulting failure of South Africa and other 
SADC countries to intervene early and effectively in Zimbabwe’s political 
crisis must carry part of the blame, with the collapse of the Zimbabwean 
economy being behind the large influx of Zimbabweans into South Africa in 
recent years, many of them among the victims of the 2008 attacks.
Sections of the South African academic community, too, appear to 
have had intellectual difficulty in naming the 2008 violence as xenophobia. 
Here, it is worth quoting at length the statement by the Council of Anthro-
pology Southern Africa, issued in response to the attacks and later cited in 
an article by South African anthropologist John Sharp (2008a:2):
As anthropologists, we are deeply concerned, both profession-
ally and as citizens, that these actions reflect a continuing 
emphasis in South African political discourse on cultural, 
racial and national differences. It is a discourse that, drawing 
on a long discarded anthropology, essentialises such differ-
ences even as it claims to celebrate them. It is a discourse that 
was central to colonialism, slavery, segregation and apartheid. 
It is a discourse that perversely persists to the present, now 
manifesting in the way the media labels as “xenophobia” 
horrendously violent acts where some South Africans raise 
fists, swing axes and pangas, and use matches to light fires 
as means to attack their fellows who happen to speak differ-
ent languages and allegedly look somewhat different from 
themselves.
Intellectually discarded though cultural essentialism rightly is, being rooted 
in racist and discriminatory ideologies and discourses, Anthropology South-
ern Africa’s reduction of representations of the attacks as “xenophobic” to 
mere labeling by the media stretches credulity. Linkages among discourse, 
belief, and practice are always indirect and fractured, but a South African 
wielding a weapon against Zimbabweans or Mozambicans on the grounds 
that they are Zimbabweans or Mozambicans—even if further associations 
attach to such labeling in terms of competing unfairly for jobs or houses 
or women, and recognizing that the very identification of an individual as 
Zimbabwean or Mozambican is to essentialize a colonially imposed national 
identity—does so because socially constructed discourses of identity poli-
tics have been internalized by citizen-subjects and translated into violent 
action, based on hatred and dehumanization of people deemed “foreign” or 
“other.” Media and political discourses might well be complicit in sustain-
ing identity politics, but the “horrendously violent acts” that the Council 
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of Anthropology Southern Africa condemns are surely xenophobic prior to 
any labeling as such.
The Anthropology Southern Africa statement went on to denounce the 
notion of “the presence of people who are deemed to be ethnically, racially 
or nationally different” as the core of the problem, and thus the closing of 
borders to immigration as any sort of solution. Instead, “the solution lies in 
a politics which explicitly fosters the non-racialism espoused by the South 
African Constitution, that rejects and resists the power of identity politics, 
and that strives for a cosmopolitanism that valorizes the contributions of 
all who have ever settled in our part of the world whilst ensuring the free-
dom of association and of cultural and linguistic expression of all human 
beings” (Anthropology Southern Africa, cited in Sharp 2008a:2). No one can 
have any argument with these goals, but they are just that: goals, requiring 
concerted and collective effort aimed at effecting fundamental social change. 
And are racialism, anticosmopolitanism, narrow identity politics, and denial 
of cultural freedoms not themselves the core components of xenophobia? 
Furthermore, the Constitution that the authors uphold itself defines certain 
rights on the basis of citizenship, thereby in effect discriminating against 
noncitizens.
Identifying these contradictions and tensions in their public statement 
is not intended to criticize Anthropology Southern Africa, for their response 
to the events of May 2008 is both praiseworthy and courageous; rather, it 
highlights the difficulty with which South African intellectuals and social 
commentators have grappled with comprehending and representing the 
acts of barbarism perpetrated by their fellow citizens against people “who 
happen to speak different languages and allegedly look somewhat different 
from themselves” (Anthropology Southern Africa, cited in Sharp 2008a:2). 
In the Guardian Weekly in October 2008, South African writer and journal-
ist Jonny Steinberg observed that South Africans still “appear unable to talk 
much about May’s violence,” finding themselves “in the midst of a very 
serious impasse about which they cannot speak” (Steinberg 2008a:27). In 
many ways, this is a hate that dare not speak its name.
Where debate continues is at scholarly conferences and in the pages 
of academic journals. Among its sharpest and most polarized airings has 
been the exchange published in August and October 2008 in Anthropology 
Today between the aforementioned Professor John Sharp, of the Depart-
ment of Anthropology and Archaeology at the University of Pretoria, and 
Suren Pillay, of the state-funded Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) 
of South Africa. Triggering the debate was the HSRC’s publication of the 
report Citizenship, Violence and Xenophobia in South Africa in June 2008, 
just weeks after the attacks. Sharp criticized the report for its “Fortress 
South Africa” approach and the researchers for their “facile labelling” of 
the violence as xenophobic (2008a:2). He presented the real explanation 
for so-called xenophobia as “the working of the global economic order” 
(2008:3). Rather than tighter border controls, his proposed solution is for the 
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South African state “to stand up to the dictates of neo-liberal orthodoxy” 
(2008a:3).
Pillay’s response accused Sharp of “mischief” in his misreading and 
misrepresenting of the report. Pillay claimed that the report neither sim-
plistically ascribed the violence to xenophobia nor proposed a “fortress” 
solution. Instead:
A more effective and progressive management of the move-
ments of people in the region needs to be put in place. .  .  . 
Citizenship, even the attractive but opaque idea of a “flexible 
cosmopolitan citizenship”, surely implies a bounded political 
community of rights and obligations under a form of sovereign 
order? Citizenship is, after all, as Foucault reminded us, first 
and foremost a political-legal construct, through which a form 
of disciplinary power rules. John Sharp seems to forget that. 
(Pillay 2008a:22)
Sharp counterattacked with this retort: “I still maintain that the ‘vulner-
ability’ which many poor South Africans face originates in the neo-liberal 
order to which capital and the state subscribe, rather than simply in unfair 
competition from illegal immigrants. If it is ‘mischievous’ to say this, then 
let mischief reign” (2008b:22).
What the Sharp–Pillay debate represents is effectively the polarization 
of the debate into two, ideologically based camps: the one based on political 
economy and a critique of neoliberal capitalism; the other based on a less 
materialist, more Foucauldian reading of politics, based on constructions of 
identity and relations of power. Pillay developed his line of reasoning in a 
presentation at the twelfth general assembly of the Council for the Develop-
ment of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) in December 2008. 
He pointed to a rupture between elite and subaltern classes, as described in 
the Jamaican case by David Scott (1999). This is manifest in forms of “sub-
altern self-fashioning,” which operate outside the normative frameworks 
of emancipatory or liberal politics and are often chauvinistic and violent in 
character (Pillay 2008b).
Another important scholar in this debate is sociologist Michael Neo-
cosmos (2006, 2008), on whose work both Pillay and Sharp draw, if to differ-
ent ends. Neocosmos’s views are cogently and convincingly articulated in 
his monograph From Foreign Natives to Native Foreigners: Exploring Xeno-
phobia in Post-Apartheid South Africa (2006) and in additional commentary 
and analysis written after the events of 2008. His central argument is that 
“popular” xenophobia is located within a “politics of fear,” with three core 
elements: “a state discourse of xenophobia,” “a discourse of South African 
exceptionalism,” and a “conception of citizenship founded exclusively on 
indigeneity” (Neocosmos 2008:587). In characterizing state discourse as 
xenophobic, he provides examples of xenophobic statements by political 
leaders and human-rights abuses by police and other state agents, similar 
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to those described above. By South African exceptionalism, he is referring 
to the widespread perception among South Africans of all races of South 
Africa’s difference from and superiority to the rest of the African continent, 
and hence the neocolonial nature of much South African discourse on Africa. 
The politics of indigeneity to which he refers are those based on the idea, 
also widely held, that “indigeneity is the only way to acquire resources, jobs, 
and all the other goodies which should be reserved for native peoples only” 
(Neocosmos 2008:591), for example in implementation of the state’s policy 
of black economic empowerment. Neocosmos’s primary intellectual and 
theoretical guides are Frantz Fanon and French philosopher Alain Badiou, 
who has spoken in similar terms about the plight of the sans-papiers in 
France (Badiou 2001, 2005).
To Neocosmos, the “xenophobic pogroms” of 2008 were entirely pre-
dictable, and “the fact that quasi-fascist politics . . . have acquired a certain 
grip over large sections of the poor should come as no surprise” (2008:592). 
In fact, almost all serious scholars of xenophobia in South Africa have drawn 
similar conclusions about the predictability of the attacks, even if they dis-
agree on matters of labeling, primary causation, and theoretical frameworks 
of explanation. The main people who claimed—or perhaps feigned—surprise 
were members of the national political elite, including some of those same 
senior government ministers whose own previous public statements had 
contributed to the hegemonizing of antiforeigner discourse (Lefko-Everett 
2008).
No one has yet fully explained either the prevalence of a culture of 
xenophobia in South Africa or the particular outbreak of that culture into 
specific acts of brutality in May 2008. What is clear is that “ordinary” or 
“everyday” xenophobia is deeply entrenched in South African society and 
directly experienced by African immigrants. Using the term perfect storm to 
capture the conjunction of historical, material, social, and political forces in 
what they call the “mayhem” of 2008, Crush et al. (2008) present the find-
ings of opinion surveys conducted in South Africa in 1999 and 2006 by the 
Southern African Migration Project. These showed South Africans to hold 
xenophobic attitudes that in many ways hardened between 1999 and 2006, 
by which date 16 percent “of those interviewed said that they were prepared 
to combine with others to force foreign nationals to leave their area” and 9 
percent “were prepared to use violence in the process” (Crush et al. 2008:37). 
Their blunt and trenchant conclusion is that “xenophobia and hostility to 
(particularly) other Africans is not the preserve of a lunatic fringe but repre-
sents the conviction of the majority of citizens” (Crush et al. 2008:7), argu-
ing that the violence could have been—and may yet be—more widespread. 
Lefko-Everett (2008:10–11) points out, as do others, that “South Africa has 
seen recurrent and sporadic violent attacks against foreigners” that “in fact 
date back to 1994,” again suggesting that the 2008 attacks, while greater in 
intensity and extent, were not without precedent or harbingers. Nor have 
anti-immigrant feelings subsided. Subsequent opinion surveys conducted by 
Afrobarometer (2009) in October and November 2008 found that 33 percent 
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of South Africans would be “likely” or “very likely” to “take part in action 
to prevent people who have come here from other African countries from 
moving into your neighbourhood.” Similar percentages applied to prevent-
ing African immigrants’ children from “sitting in the same classroom as 
your children,” “operating a business in your area,” and “becoming one of 
your co-workers.” Fully 21 percent of the survey sample felt that all people 
from other countries living in South Africa should be sent back to their own 
countries, with an additional 22 percent saying that those “who are not 
contributing to the economy” should be sent back.
Organizations such as the Forced Migration Studies Programme at the 
University of the Witwatersrand, the International Organization for Migra-
tion, and the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa have published 
reports on the 2008 violence against foreigners, variously detailing the 
events, identifying both proximate and more structural causes, evaluating 
responses by state and nonstate agencies, and proposing policy recommen-
dations (Igglesden, Molson, and Polzer 2009; Misago, Landau, and Monson 
2009; Steinberg 2008b). All support the view that the causes are deep rooted 
and systemic, and thus that the responses required to prevent recurrence 
of antiforeigner violence require concerted and sustained efforts by govern-
ment, civil society, and international organizations. Unlike those implied by 
either Neocosmos or Sharp, which would require fundamental sociopoliti-
cal or political-economic change, their recommendations tend to be located 
within existing social, political, economic, and administrative structures, 
especially local and national government and the police and justice systems, 
and can thus be viewed as remedial, rather than radical or even reformist.
Two further points must be made about academic and policy writing 
on contemporary xenophobia in South Africa. First is that almost all authors 
recognize its origins in the racism, nationalism, violence, and isolation of the 
apartheid era. Policies of race-based urban influx control, racially designated 
group areas, and ethnic “homelands” divided South Africans and made many 
of them literally and legally foreigners in their own land. Still today, migrants 
to South African cities from South Africa’s own rural areas and former 
“homelands” occupy precarious social, economic, and political positions, 
manifested in poor living conditions, high unemployment, and exposure 
to crime and violence. As was evident in 2009, and already documented in 
earlier anti-immigrant attacks in Cape Town’s Mizamoyethu community 
(Dodson and Oelofse 2000), these marginalized citizens have themselves been 
among the perpetrators of attacks on African immigrants. The antiforeigner 
attitudes of the postapartheid state and society thus not only resemble but 
perpetuate and reproduce apartheid, scaled up from the intranational to the 
international level. The second point to make is the potential for geographi-
cal broadening of focus—something currently lacking in either scholarly or 
policy research on xenophobia in South Africa. Violence and discrimination 
against foreigners is, sadly, far from rare in other international contexts. In 
a recent issue of the geographical journal Antipode, for example, Henk van 
Houtum and Freerk Boedeltje (2009) contrast the experiences of tourists and 
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illegal migrants in Europe. Their article, titled “Europe’s Shame: Death at 
the Borders of the EU,” refers to the migrants, many of them African, who 
drown in the sea crossing, suffocate in ships or trucks, or commit suicide in 
detention or deportation centers. Drawing, like Neocosmos, on the political 
philosophy of Badiou (2001, 2005), these authors use Bauman’s concept of 
“wasted lives” (2004) and Agamben’s Homo sacer (1998) to characterize the 
political and social construction of “illegal migrants,” leading in turn to “a 
subhuman and redundancy rhetoric which provokes racist populism” (van 
Houtum and Boedeltje 2009:229). South Africa, far from being exceptional 
or singular, should thus be seen as but one example of what appears to be a 
growing worldwide phenomenon of xenophobia, or at least anti-immigrant 
views. The rest of this paper details a local case study in a particular South 
African city, but the time is surely ripe for more international, comparative, 
and multiscalar research, combining theoretical and empirical insights from 
diverse geographical contexts.5
Migrants’ Experiences of Everyday Xenophobia
This section of the paper examines experiences of xenophobia as related by 
African immigrants in Cape Town in the months preceding the 2008 attacks. 
The author, a (white) South African now living and working in Canada, con-
ducted the research while on sabbatical in Cape Town in 2007–2008. Similar 
research has been published by other scholars, for example, Alan Morris 
(1998) and Maxine Reitzes (2002), who have published accounts of African 
migrants’ lives in Johannesburg. In its resonance with such earlier research 
findings, the discussion that follows provides evidence of both temporal and 
spatial continuities in Africans’ experiences of xenophobia in South Africa, 
challenging the idea that the 2008 attacks were an isolated occurrence, 
carried out by rogue “criminal elements.”
The research was inspired by the author’s inadvertent but serendipi-
tous contact with a Malawian man and a Zimbabwean woman, employed 
respectively as gardener and domestic worker in her rented sabbatical accom-
modation in Cape Town. Hearing their personal stories and developing inter-
personal relations with these African immigrants presented an opportunity 
to conduct qualitative, ethnographic research to complement the author’s 
earlier and ongoing quantitative analysis on cross-border migration in the 
region (Dodson 1998, 2008). Both these individuals had been educated to 
at least secondary-school level and were fluent in English and one or more 
African languages. They had wide social networks among other African 
immigrants living in Cape Town. Employing them as research assistants 
provided a means by which to access the experiences of other African immi-
grants. Without such an “in” to such a socially marginalized, geographically 
dispersed, and diverse-origin population, the research would have been 
extremely difficult, or even impossible. Instead of being asked to do face-to-
face interviews, the research assistants were given ballpoint pens and blank 
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school exercise books, and were asked first to record their own “migrant 
stories” and then to ask other immigrants of their acquaintance to do the 
same. No direct contact occurred between me as the researcher and any 
but the initial two subjects, and thus all but these two of the handwritten 
journals received were entirely anonymous.6 The journals were all written in 
English, a lingua franca to immigrants from the region. Adopting a biographi-
cal approach and accessing “migrant stories” has become well-established 
practice in migration studies (Gilmartin 2008; Halfacree and Boyle 1993; 
Silvey and Lawson 1999), and solicited journals or diaries are commonly 
employed as qualitative research methods in the social sciences, being used 
to good effect in vulnerable or marginalized communities, including in other 
parts of South Africa (Meth 2003).
Significantly for the argument of this paper, the research was not 
explicitly or even intentionally about xenophobia per se. Rather, it was 
designed to elicit information and opinion about the general experience of 
being an African immigrant in South Africa. A letter of information and 
invitation to potential participants outlined the general themes on which 
information and opinion were sought, such as reasons for leaving their home 
country and coming to South Africa, how they had found a job and a place 
to live, how their own neighbors and South Africans in general were behav-
ing toward them, and what they liked and did not like about living in South 
Africa. That respondents’ personal stories presented a litany of discrimina-
tion, exclusion, hostility, and violence is therefore highly telling. This was 
before the May 2008 attacks had occurred, so that there was no distortion of 
respondents’ views by those events or their aftermath. Also noteworthy are 
the pan-African origins of the thirty-three eventual respondents, who hailed 
from thirteen different countries: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, 
Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Several were from Zimbabwe, which then 
was in an even worse state of political and economic turmoil than at the 
time of writing (2009), and there were also a number from Malawi, Somalia, 
and Zambia.
While it can make no claim to being representative, this was a diverse 
sample. Respondents included men and women and represented a range 
of age, education level, and length of stay in South Africa. There was a 
diversity of occupations, though most were in low-wage, informal sectors 
of the economy, even for highly qualified people (for example, the female 
Zimbabwean cleaner was a qualified and experienced high-school teacher). 
For obvious reasons, they were not asked, nor did respondents voluntarily 
record, their immigration status; though from their documented reasons for 
leaving “home,” it is likely that the stories came from people designated 
variously as official refugees, asylum seekers, and economic migrants, both 
legal and undocumented. Interestingly, given the constrained means of 
accessing respondents, the people whose stories were obtained were found 
to be living all over the city of Cape Town, including the Southern Penin-
sula, the City Bowl, the Atlantic seaboard, the False Bay suburbs, and the 
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Cape Flats townships; and in housing ranging from formal rental housing 
in middle-class neighborhoods to shacks in informal settlements. This, too, 
makes the repetition and recurrence of accounts of exclusion and alienation 
suggestive of a more deep-seated climate of xenophobia, rather than isolated 
incidents of neighborhood-scale conflict in one or two locations.
The material that emerged was remarkably rich and detailed, as well 
as being disturbing and depressing. Much of the remainder of this section 
uses respondents’ own words to relate their personal experiences. Almost all 
provided accounts of everyday xenophobia in the fear, dislike, and disrespect 
that they encountered in simply going about their lives. These experiences 
were keenly felt and deeply resented. Each story was unique, though there 
were clear common threads. Among these commonalities were the motives, 
either economic or political, for leaving their home countries. Here are the 
words of a 26-year-old woman who had recently left Zimbabwe:
I had to leave Zimbabwe because of the economic hardships 
that I was facing there. . . . I was just in the process of enjoy-
ing my career as a teacher, but the money I was earning after 
a month was only equivalent to 100 Rand7 so I couldn’t budget 
the money, and it was not enough to buy basic foodstuff for 
only a week for me and my two-year-old daughter. So I had to 
come here for a better living.
Somali respondents, like this 16-year-old boy, described fleeing war:
We live on the border with Ethiopia and were often under 
attacks, .  .  . and life was not easy for my family. My father 
was already here in South [Africa]. So for fear of us being made 
to join the fighters my father asked me and my 2 brothers to 
join him.
Others spoke simply of “wanting a change,” or of seeking better economic 
opportunities.
Regardless of their origins and motives, and thus their likely legal 
status in the country, almost everyone had encountered negative attitudes 
from people with whom they came into contact in their everyday lives, 
including neighbors. As is evident in the quotations below, these attitudes 
are themselves perceived in racial terms, with distinctions drawn among 
whites, coloreds, and Xhosas:8
Currently where I’m staying now, my South African neigh-
bours do not like me at all. Sometimes when I greet them they 
ignore or they answer in a very low voice. Generally some 
of the South African people do not enjoy seeing us in their 
country and I have a feeling that they do not like us, especially 
most South African women. (26-year-old Zimbabwean female)
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The coloured neighbours are very mutual and we communi-
cate well, . . . but the Xhosas are very hostile and bitter, only 
a few may greet you and talk to you. (40-year-old Zimbabwean 
female)
Some neighbours are very friendly but others they swear [at] 
us saying kwirikwiri,9 which is not right—we are all African. 
(29-year-old Malawian male)
South Africans in general are racists. Xhosas think they own 
this part of the country and no-one should invade it. This is 
not a good attitude. . . . We were all created by one God. We 
are all human beings. (60-year-old DRC female)
I live in a white community. My neighbours are very friendly 
and helpful. When I meet some of them, we share stories about 
the ever-changing weather and current affairs. .  .  . Xhosas, 
some of them are extremely nice but others are racists. I am 
very dark brown in complexion so they scorn and laugh at me. 
They also mock my accent. . . . Though I am comfortable here, 
I won’t encourage my friends to come to SA, because Xhosas 
are racists. (45-year-old Kenyan male)
Explanation for such treatment at the hands of South African neighbors was 
seldom offered, but where it was provided, respondents typically noted that 
South Africans “accuse us of taking their jobs and women” (27-year-old 
Zimbabwean male). Also recorded were experiences of robbery and other 
forms of violence:
The Xhosas are a bit naïve towards us—they blame us for caus-
ing unemployment to them. But the coloureds are better and 
appreciate us better. Though at times they waylay us and force 
us to give them change or Rands for beer and cigars. (28-year-
old Malawian male)
Others say just because we’re foreigners we can’t run business 
because we are getting their jobs, but it doesn’t mean that. 
Others they rob us. But foreigners like from Malawi, Congo, 
Tanzania, Zambia are good to us. (34-year-old Somali male)
I am a victim of thuggery as I was beaten and my money 
and phone taken. . . . After being mugged twice before, I am 
always conscious that thieves are everywhere in South Africa. 
(38-year-old Zimbabwean female)
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They are very hostile and often attack and rob us. Even in the 
streets they stop us and ask for money. We are also ridiculed 
and beaten for no reason. The coloureds and the Xhosas are the 
problem. They break into our shop and steal our goods. . . . But 
others are friendly and compassionate, they even come to warn 
me if the robbers intend to attack us. I have learnt to befriend a 
lot of the local boys to buy freedom. (16-year-old Somali male)
Disturbing in themselves, such experiences present warning signals of the 
violence that was to come. They echo the xenophobic attitudes that surveys 
have demonstrated as being held by large segments of South African society 
and the use of violence in their expression. They communicate the climate 
of fear and exclusion in which African immigrants in the cities of South 
Africa already lived, even before May 2008. Certainly they expose, as either 
ignorant or disingenuous, the statements by Mbeki and other members of his 
government that South Africans are not xenophobic, or suddenly became so 
for a few mad weeks one May. They hint at the enmeshed economic, social, 
and political foundations of xenophobia, along with its origins in the racial 
divisions of apartheid. As Neocosmos put it, writing after the 2008 attacks: 
“ ‘the chickens have come home to roost’ ” (2008:592).
Conclusions, Reflections, and Future Directions
Along with similar findings from scholarship dating back to 1994, these 
retellings of migrants’ experiences suggest that entrenched xenophobia is 
in large part what lay behind the 2008 violence. The findings do not, how-
ever, provide straightforward evidence to help resolve the debate over the 
primary cause of xenophobia (or “antiforeigner violence”). Whether one 
chooses Marx, Foucault, Fanon, or Badiou as one’s intellectual guide, much 
remains to be understood and explained about xenophobia in South Africa. 
Nor should the niceties—or sometimes not-so-niceties—of academic debate 
stand in the way of confronting xenophobia in all its political, social, and 
economic dimensions, and wherever it occurs, in either geographical space or 
the hierarchies of power. Geographically conceptualized analysis, examining 
processes operating at different scales, as well as interscale linkages, is likely 
to prove especially useful. Such analysis can make more evident the “nest-
ing” of scale and process, for example local competition over low-wage jobs 
within national macroeconomic policies, or local micropolitics within wider 
relations of power and patronage. It can demonstrate the mutually entangled 
scales at which discrimination and exclusion are enacted and experienced, 
from the microscale of dwelling and neighborhood to the national level of 
immigration law and constructions of citizenship. Such analysis will allow 
comparison with other geographical and historical contexts. Also important 
in further analysis is to examine the opinions and attitudes of the perpetra-
tors and not just the victims of violence. This demands ongoing, longitudinal 
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research, along the lines of that already being conducted by Afrobarometer, 
the Human Sciences Research Council, the Forced Migration Project, and the 
Southern African Migration Project. Only thus will it be possible to under-
stand the mechanisms behind South Africans’ violent “othering” of African 
immigrants and to locate it within South Africa’s uneven and unfinished 
sociopolitical transformation.
More recent protests over housing and service delivery have seen 
revived expressions of xenophobia in parts of the country (BBC 22 July 2009; 
York 2009), though it is unclear whether any upsurge is being manufactured 
by the media or is an accurate reflection of on-the-ground realities. The risks 
of a recurrence of the events of May 2008 appear to be genuine. Even in the 
absence of such concentrated brutality, the everyday forms of xenophobia 
experienced by African immigrants are a stain on the reputation of the 
South African “rainbow nation”—one that has yet to register fully on South 
Africans’ collective social conscience. Insights into African immigrants’ 
daily lives add motive and impetus to intellectual and political grappling 
with these issues. They challenge academic researchers to conduct further 
enquiries and continue to “speak truth to power,” and political leaders and 
policymakers to acknowledge the severity and complexity of an issue that 
they urgently need to tackle.
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notes
1. the man was ernesto alfabeto nhamuave, a mozambican who had come to south africa to 
look for work. gruesome images of his death appeared in several newspapers, and his life and 
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death have been commemorated in Burning Man: Ernesto Alfabeto Nhamuave, a film by adze 
ugah, part of an initiative called films against racism (tolsi 2008).
2. sources for the slogans listed here include photographs in print and online media, as well as 
personal communications with my relatives and friends who attended the march in Johannes-
burg on 24 may 2008. see, for example, www.monstersandcritics.com/news/africa/features/
article_1407373.php/.
3. my thanks to late south african geographer glen elder (2003) for highlighting the significance 
of this observation.
4. something at which mbeki has proven himself a past master on other, equally important 
sociopolitical issues, for example hiv/aiDs (nattrass 2007).
5. here, the work of nyamnjoh (2006), comparing south africa and Botswana, stands as an 
exception and promising example, albeit still within a southern african context.
6. all were, of course, confidential.
7. the rand is the south african currency, currently valued at approximately eight to the u.s. 
dollar.
8. this employs the common south african terminology of coloured, referring to “mixed-race”; 
the Xhosa are one of the largest african ethnolinguistic groups in the country.
9. a derogatory term, based on scornful imitation of the accents of some southern africans.
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